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Abstract:
This study aims to understand the causal linkage between terrorism and various economic
indicators such as Gross Domestic Product, Tourism, and Foreign Direct Investment by
running a Granger Causality regression. The expected results will show that terrorism does
indeed decrease or increase as a result of changes in these economic indicators. In order to
test for Granger Causality a unit-root test will first be performed, followed by a cointegration test. The results show that each nation experiences a different causal
relationship with each of these indicators. Inflation is the most significant causal indicators
in terms of percentage of countries tested which have a significant causal relationship. The
results of this study will be helpful in making advice for policy decisions. Ultimately,
ensuring economic stability, especially in regards to inflation, is the biggest policy
implication to be taken away from this study.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This study examines the causal relationship between terrorism and various
economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product, Foreign Direct Investment, Inflation,
and Unemployment. The goal is to understand these relationships in order to provide
insightful policy implications. It is expected that each of these indicators will have a
significant causal relationship with terrorism for at least some of the tested countries that
are concerned with in this study. These countries include Pakistan, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Spain. It is expected that
terrorism will decrease as GDP increases. It is expected that FDI will decrease as terrorism
increases. Finally, it is expected that terrorism will increase as Inflation and Unemployment
increases.
This topic is gaining increasing importance as a result of the dramatic rise in
terrorist activity over the past several years which will be discussed in further detail. Acts
of terrorism can be motivated by various different factors. Some of these factors include,
but are not limited to political, nationalistic, religious, and economic factors. This study is
particularly concerned with those economic motivating factors. A greater understanding of
these motivating factors will help to implement policies that will combat terrorism.
This topic is also of growing importance in the political spectrum as a result of the current
events occurring in Europe because of the wave of Syrian refugees. Everyone is closely
watching political leaders all of the world, especially the US in regards to the upcoming
election. Ultimately, the goal is to determine more efficient ways in combating both
domestic and transnational terrorism.
2.0 TREND OF TERRORISM
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the trend of global terrorism during the time period that
this study is concerned with (1981-2014). This graph shows the rise in global terror
incidents over the past three and a half decades. This rise particularly spikes over the last
several years, a trend which reinforces the importance of this topic and the need for
discovering policy implications to reduce terrorism in developed and developing nations.

Figure 1.1: Global Terror Incidents

Source: Global Terrorism Database
Figure 1.2 demonstrates the current trend of terrorism in select Middle Eastern
countries. This graph depicts the sum of all terror incidents in the three Middle Eastern
countries selected for this study: Pakistan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. The countries in this
graph experience a similar spike in terrorism that is witnessed on a global scale. Therefore,
it can be concluded that terror activities in the Middle East (specifically the three countries
included) over the past several years have at least partially contributed to the recent global
rise in terrorism.
Figure 1.3 demonstrates the current trend of terrosim in select European countries.
This graph depicts the sum of all terror incidents in the six European countries selected for
this study: France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. This graph
does not show the same rise in terrorism over the past several years, but rather a decline.
Therefore, it can be concluded that these six European countries have not contributed
significantly in this drastic rise in terror activities.

Figure 1.2: Middle Eastern Terror Incidents

Source: Global Terrorism Database
Figure 1.3: European Terror Incidents

Source: Global Terrorism Database
In addition to the general spike in terrorism, this topic has other important policy
implications as a result of current events. The Syrian refugee crisis is a hotly debated topic
in the political realm. Various foreign powers are in the process of debating foreign policy
which could result in either closing borders entirely or opening them to these refugees.
Some European countries have already loosened their borders to provide refuge. The
current debate is whether or not these countries will feel the backlash of this policy decision
in terms of a potential increase in terror activity. This study will determine relationships

between terror activity and various economic indicators which will perhaps provide insight
into some of these policy decisions. Ultimately, the decision to house refugees will rely
more heavily on the security threat of opening up borders, and not solely on the
relationships discussed in this research. However, some insight will be applicable.
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
Meierrieks and Gries (2012) found that the causation between terrorism and growth
is heterogeneous over time and space. They believe this causality can be explained by the
changing geographical and ideological terrorism that was witnessed at the end of the Cold
War era. Evidence of this was demonstrated through the decrease in terrorist activity in
Latin American countries as they experienced economic growth. In African and Islamic
countries, terrorism was found to drastically hinder growth in countries with high levels of
political instability and low levels of political openness. Gries et al. (2009) found a strong
causal linkage between economic performance and domestic terrorism. They examined
several Western European nations and found that economic performance was important for
some of the countries in determining terrorist violence and that all of the attacked
economies were successful in overcoming the threat of terrorism. Piazza (2006) conducted
a study which analyzes and evaluates the hypothesis that economic issues such as poverty,
inequality, and poor development are the main causes of terrorism. This study actually
concluded that no relationship was found between terrorism and economic development
factors. However, he found a relationship between other variables including population,
ethno-religious diversity, repression, and structure of party politics which was found to be
the most significant.
One study investigates whether or not and to what extent transnational terrorism
affects US FDI. They found through a time-series analysis that the 9/11 attacks did not
generally have a lasting effect on US FDI flows. Turkey was the only country which
experienced a long lasting drop in US FDI. They also examined the effect that terrorist
attacks against US interests had on the stock of US FDI. They found that these attacks had
a significant, but small impact on these stocks. The largest declines were experienced by
Greece and Turkey which were 5.7% and 6.5% of their average US FDI stocks respectively
(Enders et al., 2006). Busse and Hefeker (2005) examined the relationship between

political risk and FDI inflows. Contrary to the results of the previous study mentioned, they
found that some factors are highly significant determinants of FDI inflows. The variables
include government stability, absence of internal conflict, absence of ethnic tensions, basic
democratic rights, and the ensuring law and order.
Shahbaz (2013) examined the relationship between inflation, economic growth, and
terrorism in Pakistan. The empirical results confirmed the co-integration between these
variables. He found that an increase in inflation corresponds to an increase in terrorist
activity. Using a Granger Causality approach, he discovered bidirectional causality
between inflation and terrorism. He concludes with the policy implication of lowering and
steadying inflation in order to reduce terror activity in Pakistan. In another study, Shahbaz
and Shabbir (2011) examine the same hypothesis of whether or not inflation is the
economic indicator responsible for the spike in terrorism in Pakistan. This study resulted
in the same finding that inflation and terrorism are co-integrated and that inflation is
responsible for Granger causing terrorism. They also discovered that economic growth is
also a major contributor in determining terrorist activity.

4.0 DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
4.1 Data
This study uses annual time series data from 1981 to 2014. Data was obtained from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The data extrapolated includes
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices at current US$ and net inflows of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) at current US$ for the following nine countries: Israel, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Data was
also taken for annual percent Inflation using consumer prices and total Unemployment as
a percent of total labor force. Due to data availability restrictions, this data was only
obtained for the four following countries: Israel, France, Italy, and Spain. In addition, Total
Population was taken for all nine countries in order to calculate per capita GDP and per
capita terror attacks.
Data was obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for annual Total
Terror Incidents for all nine countries. This is defined as all incidents, regardless of doubt.
GTD does not have any data regarding information from the year 1993. Therefore, terror

attacks for 1993 for all countries was estimated by calculating the average between terror
attacks occurring in 1992 and 1994.
4.2 Empirical Model
This study uses the same Granger Causality model followed by Meierrieks and
Gries (2012) in order to test for unidirectional and/or bidirectional causality between terror
attacks and GDP, FDI, Inflation and Unemployment. The time stationary bivariate model
can be written as follows:
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The variable x is the measure of terrorism for county i over t periods of time. This
is measured by the number of terror incidents, regardless of doubt for every 100,000
inhabitants in that specific country. The variable y represents the indicator being tested for
causality (GDP, FDI, Inflation, and Unemployment). GDP is measured as market prices at
current US$. FDI is net inflows measured at current US$. Inflation is measured as a percent
using the consumer price index. Unemployment is measured as total unemployment as a
percent of the total labor force. The autogressive slope coefficients (α and δ) are identical
for all cross-sections, but may very over different lags. The regression coefficients are
constrained to be equal over different lags. The lag order of the model may run from l = 1
to p. This study works with lag lengths ranging from p = 1 to p = 5. The variables μ and η
are the country-specific effects; the constant is always excluded. The variables u and v are
the error terms.
Testing for Granger Causality includes the following three steps. First, a unit-root
test must be conducted to determine whether or not the data should be taken at level or at
the first difference. This study used the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. Second, the
variables must be tested for co-integration to ensure they are correlated. If the variables are
not cointegrated, the Granger Causality test cannot be completed. This study uses the
Johansen System Cointegration Test. Finally, if the variables are cointegrated, they can be

tested for Granger Causality. At this point, a lag length is selected (which will vary for each
individual country), and the variables will be tested for unidirectional and bidirectional
causality. Based on previous studies, it is expected that a causal relationship between
terrorism and GDP, FDI, Inflation, and Unemployment will exist for some, but perhaps not
all of the tested countries as this relationship has been found to be heterogeneous over space
and time.
5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results are presented in the following tables. Table 5.1 demonstrates
the ADF, co-integration, and Granger Causality test results for the relationship between
terror attacks and GDP. Table 5.2 demonstrates the results for FDI, Table 5.3 shows the
results for Inflation, and Table 5.4 shows the results for Unemployment. For each of the
four indicators tested, the data fell in the 1% significance range when taken at the first
difference. Refer to Appendix A to see a sample regression for the relationship between
terrorism and GDP in Pakistan.
Table 5.1 shows that only two countries (Germany and Ireland) have no cointegration between terror attacks and GDP. Of the seven countries that do have cointegration, Italy and the United Kingdom do not experience Granger Causality at a
significant level. Pakistan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, France, and Spain each have a significant
relationship between terror attacks and GDP. For Pakistan, France, and Spain, it is GDP
that Granger causes terror attacks. For Israel and Saudi Arabia, it is terror attacks that
Granger causes GDP. Pakistan, Israel, and France are calculated at a lag length of 2, while
Israel and Saudi Arabia are calculated at lag length 5, and Spain at lag length 1. All of the
countries that have a significant relationship, with the exception of Israel, are significant at
the 5% level; Israel is significant at the 10% level.

Table 5.1: Empirical Results (GDP)
Country

ADF Statistic:

Co-integration

Granger Causality

first difference

Test

F-Statistic

Pakistan

23.9063***

YES

GDP → TERROR 4.9689** 2

Israel

45.7481***

YES

TERROR → GDP 2.5367*

Saudi Arabia

65.0132***

YES

TERROR → GDP 2.9511** 5

France

31.1771***

YES

GDP → TERROR 3.6188** 2

Germany

36.3894***

NO

Ireland

45.5583***

NO

Italy

33.2704***

YES

NO CAUSALITY

Spain

24.5787***

YES

GDP → TERROR 7.5515** 1

United Kingdom

29.2689***

YES

NO CAUSALITY

Note: ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 5.2 shows that Saudi Arabia is the only country with a significant causal
relationship between terror attacks and FDI. For Israel, Italy, and Spain, the variables are
co-integrated, but do not experience Granger Causality at a significant level. Terror attacks
and FDI are not co-integrated for the remaining countries. In Saudi Arabia, it is terror
attacks that Granger causes FDI, taken at lag length 5, and falling the 1% significance
range.

Table 5.2: Empirical Results (FDI)

Lag

5

Country

ADF Statistic: first Co-integration

Granger Causality

difference

Test

F-Statistic

Pakistan

29.1249***

NO

Israel

48.0282***

YES

NO CAUSALITY

Saudi Arabia

51.7975***

YES

TERROR → FDI 6.0454***

France

36.1701***

NO

Germany

54.2041***

NO

Ireland

72.8762***

NO

Italy

41.0946***

YES

NO CAUSALITY

Spain

44.9766***

YES

NO CAUSALITY

United

50.1148***

NO

Lag

5

Kingdom
Note: ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 5.3: Empirical Results (Inflation)
Country

ADF Statistic:

Co-integration

Granger Causality F-Statistic

Lag

first difference

Test

Israel

34.5494***

YES

TERROR → INFLATION 4.6359***

5

France

40.2233***

YES

INFLATION → TERROR 2.9517*

1

Italy

32.5910***

YES

TERROR → INFLATION 4.9058**

1

Spain

55.6439***

YES

INFLATION → TERROR 3.5850*

1

Note: ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 5.3 demonstrates that each of the four countries (Israel, France, Italy, and
Spain) tested for Granger Causality between terror attacks and Inflation do have a

significant causal relationship. Israel has the greatest significance level at 1%, while Italy
is significant and 5%, and France and Spain are significant at 10%. For Israel, the Granger
Causality regression is run at lag length 5 while the remaining countries are run at leg
length 1. For Israel and Italy, it is terror attacks that Granger cause Inflation. For France
and Spain, it is Inflation that Granger causes terror attacks.
Table 5.4 demonstrates that Italy is the only country with a significant causal
relationship between terror attacks and Unemployment, and it is only significant at the 10%
level taken at lag length 1. In France, it is Unemployment that Granger causes terror attacks.
For Italy and Spain, the variables are co-integrated, but not significant when tested for
Granger Causality. For Israel, terror attacks and Unemployment are not co-integrated at
all.
Table 5.4: Empirical Results (Unemployment)
Country ADF Statistic:

Co-integration

first difference

Test

Israel

28.3456***

NO

France

29.0173***

YES

Granger Causality F-Statistic

Lag

UNEMPLOYMENT → TERROR

1

10.5332*
Italy

50.2695***

YES

NO CAUSALITY

Spain

19.8336***

YES

NO CAUSALITY

Note: ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Ultimately, Inflation is the economic indicator with the greatest percentage of
significant results as all countries tested have a significant Granger causal relationship
between Inflation and terror attacks. It is also important to note that none of the results
demonstrated bidirectional relationships. Rather all of the significant relationships were
unidirectional.

5.0 CONCLUSION
This research study does have data limitations. Fist, as previously mention the GTD
is missing data for the year 1993. This was adjusted for by averaging the terror attacks
between the years 1992 and 1994 for each given country. This method was the best solution
for accounting for the missing data, but does unfortunately misrepresent the data for that
year. Also, this study was forced to omit countries of interest as a result of data limitations.
Some of those countries includes Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran for which the terrorism data
was available, but the economic indicator data was not available through the World Bank’s
WDI. Finally, data limitations regarding Inflation weakens the results of this study. All
four of the countries tested experience a significant relationship between terror attacks and
Inflation. This study would have benefited from testing more countries for the relationship
between those two indicators to see if that trend would have continued. Unfortunately, the
data was not available for the five other countries this study was concerned with.
Ultimately, this study concludes with the same finding as the studies previously
mentioned that terrorism and various economic indicators have a heterogeneous
relationship over space and time. Basically, the relationship for each indicator varies
according to each specific country. This conclusion is most accurately depicted by
reviewing the empirical results of GDP. Refer to Table 1 to see that some countries have
significant causal relationships between terrorism and GDP while other countries do not
experience any co-integration between the variables. Even for indicators such as Inflation
where every country experienced a significant causal relationship, the relationship does
vary. For instance, refer to Table 3 to see that for Israel and Italy it is terror attacks that
Granger causes Inflation while for France and Spain it is Inflation that granger causes terror
attacks. Another major finding of this study is that these relationship vary even within
regions. This study examined three Middle Eastern countries and six European countries
expecting to discover similar causal relationships within those regions. However, that
expected result was not the case. Refer to Table 1 to see that in Israel and Saudi Arabia it
is terror attacks that Granger cause GDP while in Pakistan it is GDP that Granger causes
terror attacks. This finding perhaps provides insights into the different motivating factors
behind terrorism, demonstrating that these motives can vary even within specific regions.
It’s also important to consider why some of these countries have the individual results that

they do. For example, Saudi Arabia is the only country with a significant causal
relationship between terror attacks and FDI out of the nine countries tested. This unique
relationship should be examined. The co-integration and significant causal relationship
between terror attacks and FDI in Saudi Arabia could perhaps be a result of Saudi Arabia’s
intense oil richness and high oil exports. A similar unique causal relationship is witnessed
between terror attacks and Unemployment in France. France is the only country of the four
tested that has a significant causal relationship for this indicator. This relationship can
perhaps be explained by the severe unemployment problems in France. In France, it is
Unemployment that Granger causes terror attacks which could be explained by potential
revolts when unemployment spikes.
In conclusion, this study does result in valuable policy implications in combating
terrorism. Countries and political leaders should focus on increasing political stability and
especially economic stability. As the empirical results show, for many of these countries,
there is at least one economic indicator that has a causal relationship with terrorism.
Therefore, each of these countries would benefit and hopeful see a decline in terrorism with
an increase in economic stability. Countries should specifically focus on stabilizing their
inflation. However, the most important policy implication is for each country to understand
their specific individual relationship between terrorism and various economic indicators.
Understanding that specific relationship will allow policy makers to target their focus on
the specific indicators that have the greatest causal relationship with terrorism in their
country. Finally, and more generally, countries should focus on increasing the opportunity
cost of terrorism. Ultimately, there are various motivations for terrorist activity, some of
which are economic factors. Policy makers should focus on decreasing these motives and
increasing other economic opportunities.

Appendix A: Sample Regression (Pakistan)
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)
Series: PCGDP, PCTERROR
Date: 04/10/16 Time: 20:07
Sample: 1981 2014
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags

Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0
Total (balanced) observations: 64
Cross-sections included: 2
Method
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
ADF - Choi Z-stat

Statistic
23.9063
-3.92941

Prob.**
0.0001
0.0000

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
Intermediate ADF test results D(UNTITLED)
Series
D(PCGDP)
D(PCTERROR)

Prob.
0.0087
0.0007

Date: 04/10/16 Time: 20:09
Sample: 1981 2014
Included observations: 32
Series: PCTERROR PCGDP
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Selected
(0.05 level*)
Number of

Lag
0
0

Max Lag
7
7

Obs
32
32

Cointegrating
Relations by
Model
Data Trend:
Test Type
Trace
Max-Eig

None
No Intercept
No Trend
1
1

None
Intercept
No Trend
1
1

Linear
Intercept
No Trend
0
1

Linear
Intercept
Trend
0
0

Quadratic
Intercept
Trend
0
0

*Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)
Information
Criteria by
Rank and
Model
Data Trend:
Rank or
No. of CEs

None
No Intercept
No Trend

None
Intercept
No Trend

Linear
Intercept
No Trend

Linear
Intercept
Trend

Quadratic
Intercept
Trend

0
1
2

Log
Likelihood by
Rank (rows)
and Model
(columns)
-192.9619
-185.2721
-184.9509

-192.9619
-183.8514
-182.6531

-190.0734
-182.8097
-182.6531

-190.0734
-182.5175
-179.5190

-184.9368
-179.8815
-179.5190

0
1
2

Akaike
Information
Criteria by
Rank (rows)
and Model
(columns)
12.31012
12.07950
12.30943

12.31012
12.05321
12.29082

12.25459
12.05061
12.29082

12.25459
12.09484
12.21994

12.05855
11.99260*
12.21994

0
1
2

Schwarz
Criteria by
Rank (rows)
and Model
(columns)
12.49334
12.44594
12.85908

12.49334
12.46545
12.93208

12.52942
12.50865
12.93208

12.52942
12.59869
12.95280

12.42499*
12.54225
12.95280

Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 04/10/16 Time: 20:10
Sample: 1981 2014
Lags: 5
Null Hypothesis:
PCGDP does not Granger Cause PCTERROR
PCTERROR does not Granger Cause PCGDP

Obs

F-Statistic

Prob.

29

2.53371
1.35007

0.0664
0.2888
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